World Philosophy Day Celebrated
UNESCO launched World Philosophy Day in 2002 to highlight the importance of philosophical thinking and to create connections between philosophers and the public. Every year, UNESCO's World Philosophy Day is celebrated to share with people the importance and relevance of philosophy in our daily lives.
The Department of Philosophy held its traditional annual one-day conference to celebrate UNESCO's World Philosophy Day 2010 on Wednesday, November 24th. The aim of the conference is to make philosophy accessible to all and thereby foster independent and critical thought.
A packed audience was treated to a series of fascinating talks. The theme of the conference this year was "Between Authority and Freedom: Problems in Democratic Political Theory." Asst. Prof. Lars Vinx ably organized the event which started with an excellent set of presentations and ensuing discussion sessions with contributions by İ.D.V. Özel Bilkent Lisesi 11th grade students (Aybike Kerpişçi, Barışcan Aksu, Birsu Şallı, Ekin İl, İpek Auf, ve Sude Rençber) under the supervision of Ülkü Özet, their philosophy teacher. Department of Philosophy faculty then contributed to the event four exciting talks: Asst. Prof. Bill Wringe gave a talk entitled "Do Corporations Have No Shame? Collective Emotions and Expressive Theories of Punishment." We all agree that it is sometimes right to punish individuals for actions that they take on behalf of a commercial enterprise, but what about punishing the commercial enterprise itself via fines or compulsory dissolution? Does this make sense? If we think that the purpose of punishment is to deter certain kinds of behavior, it might do. Unfortunately, though, there is some evidence that deterrent-based theories of punishment are ineffective in the corporate case. Thinking about punishment as a kind of communication might help us to make more sense of the idea of punishing commercial enterprises, but only if we think it makes sense to think of a commercial enterprise as something that could have a sense of shame.
Prof. Ulrich Steinvorth spoke on "Toleration in Mill and in Modern Societies." Which activities are citizens to tolerate in their co-citizens? John Stuart Mill answered this question by appeal to the so-called harm principle: we are to tolerate any activity that does not harm anyone not voluntarily participating in the activity. But Mill allowed the state to hinder (e.g., gambling) even though this activity obviously harms no-one who does not voluntarily participate in it. Mill's wavering may seem a weakness as long as we do not think of voluntary slavery or even voluntary cannibalism. Steinvorth argued that to be tolerated an activity must not only harm anyone not voluntarily participating in it but must also not restrict the use of constructive capabilities.
Asst. Prof. Lars Vinx explored "The Incoherence of Popular Sovereignty." The talk argued that the legitimacy of a constitution cannot be based on the notion of strong popular sovereignty. According to conceptions of strong popular sovereignty, a constitution can only be justified if it has been created by people who exist prior to the constitution itself and if it expresses the people's homogeneous moral identity. However, such a view does not allow a constitution to function as a system for the peaceful resolution of social conflict among citizens with different moral identities. Since peaceful conflict-resolution is the central function of legitimacy, conceptions of strong popular sovereignty fail to explain the legitimacy of a constitution.
Asst. Prof. Simon Wigley discussed "Democratic Authority and the Problem of Subversive Advocacy." There is an extensive literature on the question of whether constitutional courts should have the power to strike down legislation that undermines democratic rule. Less attention has been paid to whether they should also have the power to exclude political actors that plan to use democratic procedures to install non-democratic rule. That possibility is not paradoxical if we accept that the authority of democratic assemblies rests on their capacity to produce just decisions. If, however, we accept that democratic authority rests on the intrinsic value embodied in the democratic process, then banning does appear paradoxical. Wigley considered whether there is proceduralist justification of exclusion which is self-defeating.
The conference was attended by students and faculty from a wide range of departments at Bilkent.